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COMMENTS
STICKS AND STONES MAY BREAK MY BONES, BUT
WORDS CAN NEVER HURT ME: REGULATING
SPEECH ON UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES
"Because it is a university, Marquette is committed unreservedly to
open and free inquiry."'
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of
the State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in
its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbi-
trary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They
believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the
secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will
and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery
and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly
discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordina-
rily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doc-
trine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that
public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a funda-
mental principle of the American government. They recognized the
risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew
that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for
its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and
imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate;
that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in
the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed
remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.2
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a growing hostility toward minority students on university
campuses around the country.3 Racial incidents were reported on 115 cam-
1. MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY, LAW SCHOOL 1990-1991, at 13 (1990).
2. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring),
overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
3. Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2331-32 (1989); see also James H. Andrews, Free Speech: How Free Is Too
Free?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 12, 1991, at 7; Nancy Gibbs, Bigots in the Ivory Tower,
TIME, May 7, 1990, at 104, 104 (250 campuses reported racist incidents including swastikas
painted on walls, violent attacks, and death threats).
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puses in 1989' and almost one-third of all colleges reported incidents of
intolerance during the 1990-1991 school year.' Racial epithets, racist, sex-
ist, and homophobic graffiti on dormitory walls, sexual harassment, racially
motivated physical attacks, and even death threats have become common
on campus.
6
Recent events at the University of Wisconsin at Madison ("UW-
Madison") are illustrative of the problems many colleges are experiencing.
In 1987, the Phi Gamma Delta fraternity held a "Fiji Island" party where
fraternity members wore black face paint and erected a plywood statue of a
black man with a bone through his nose.7 Fraternity members disrupted a
party by shouting racial and ethnic slurs and epithets.' Members of an Illi-
nois fraternity visiting their Madison chapter interrupted several African
Studies classes by yelling racial epithets and obscenities and setting off stink
bombs.9 A mock slave auction was performed by new fraternity pledges
who dressed up in black face paint and afro wigs. They performed skits
demeaning popular black entertainers after which fraternity members bid
for the pledges' services."0 Unfortunately, these events in Madison are not
isolated anomalies; similar incidents plague campuses across the country."
Given the unsettling number of racial attacks on campuses and the in-
creasing intolerance shown minorities, calls for action have been heard at
many universities and colleges. Student-organized protest movements, ob-
4. Alexander Cockburn, Beat the Devil: Bush & P.C. - A Conspiracy so Immense.... 252
NATION 690, 690 (May 27, 1991).
5. Kenneth J. Cooper, 'Political Correctness' Conflicts Not Widespread, College Administra-
tors Say, WASH. POST, July 29, 1991, at A5.
6. See Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85
Nw. U. L. REV. 343, 349-58 (1991); Andrews, supra note 3, at 7; Gibbs, supra note 3, at 104;
Holly Metz, Bad Apples, Evil Deeds: How Law Students Deface Free Speech, STUDENT LAW., Feb.
1990, at 32, 33.
7. UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Delgado,
supra note 6, at 355 (footnotes omitted).
8. Delgado, supra note 6, at 356. Phi Gamma Delta members were once again the offenders.
9. Id. at 356-57. These interruptions were eventually determined to be racially motivated.
Id. at 357.
10. Linda P. Campbell, College Debate: Free Speech vs. Freedom from Bigotry, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 18, 1991, at 1; Court Voids Wisconsin U's Ban on Hate Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1991,
§ 1, at 25; Ken Emerson, Only Correct, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 18, 1991, at 18, 18.
11. See Matsuda, supra note 3, at 2331-32; see also Cockburn, supra note 4, at 690 (University
of Connecticut football players spat upon several Asian-American women while shouting racial
epithets, and a group of 3000 whites beat any black person in their way at the University of
Massachusetts); Cooper, supra note 5, at A5 (describing similar experiences at colleges across the
nation); Gibbs, supra note 3, at 104; Jon Wiener, Words That Wound: Free Speech for Campus
Bigots?, 250 NATION 272, 272-73, (Feb. 26, 1990) (racist jokes were broadcast over the University
of Michigan student radio station; Arizona State University incident where fraternity party goers
surrounded three black students, hurled racial epithets at the students, and beat them).
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jecting to insensitive and insulting behavior, demanded action to remedy
the growing problems of intolerance. 12 Minority groups urged college offi-
cials to adopt regulations punishing derogatory and discriminatory lan-
guage.13 At the same time, civil libertarians insisted on maintaining full
freedom of speech at the nation's colleges. This placed administrators in a
difficult position; school officials were expected to acknowledge and attempt
to remedy the harmful effects of intolerance while remaining an institution
of higher learning committed to freedom of expression. Many administra-
tors responded to the pressure by enacting "hate speech" regulations; more
than 200 campuses have instituted speech codes punishing racist or other-
wise derogatory language. 4
This Comment discusses and analyzes the multitude of problems cre-
ated by hate speech codes. Part Two describes the long tradition and the
many values freedom of expression encompasses. The recent decision inval-
idating the University of Wisconsin system's hate speech rule, UWM Post,
Inc. v. Board of Regents, 5 is analyzed closely in Part Three. The special
relationship existing between colleges and free speech is contemplated in
Part Four. Part Five concludes by suggesting that speech codes be volunta-
rily revoked and other alternatives be employed to solve the problems of
intolerance on campus.
II. THE TRADITION OF FREE SPEECH
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble; and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.1 6
A. First Amendment Values
The First Amendment has long occupied a special place in American
society 7 as one of the most fundamental and strongly held liberties United
12. Gibbs, supra note 3, at 105.
13. id
14. Breaking the Codes, NEW REPUBLIC, July 8, 1991, at 7, 8; Campbell, supra note 10, at I
("100 to 200 of the nation's 3,600 colleges and universities enacted speech codes").
15. 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
17. "Freedom of speech is one of the most remarkable and celebrated aspects of American
constitutional law. It helps define who we are as a nation." Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social
Structure, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1405, 1405 (1986).
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States citizens enjoy."8 The ability of American citizens to freely communi-
cate opinions and ideas is frequently considered to be a cornerstone of
America's liberal democracy.19 The main purpose of the First Amendment
is to preserve democracy by allowing citizens to decide what kind of life
they wish to lead.2" Thomas Emerson, in his seminal work on the First
Amendment, enumerates four benefits freedom of expression provides for
society.21 First, free speech ensures individual self-fulfillment by assisting
the development of the individual character.22 "The first amendment may
be viewed as a recognition of the overriding importance of developing the
uniquely human abilities to think, reason, and appreciate."23 Second, free
expression leads to the continual advancement of knowledge and the dis-
covery of truth.24 To make fully informed and intelligent decisions, people
must consider and analyze all sides of an issue no matter how unacceptable
a particular opinion may be considered.25 Third, free expression allows all
elements of society to participate in the decision-making process. 26 Large
groups of people otherwise unable to actively participate in the political
process are able to contribute by expressing their cares and concerns. 27 Fi-
nally, free expression maintains the "precarious balance between healthy
cleavage and necessary consensus."' 28 Although a group's idea may be de-
feated, the group is more likely to accept the decision because it had the
opportunity to present and support its position with the strongest available
arguments.29
The "marketplace of ideas" doctrine that free and open discussion pro-
motes knowledge and the discovery of truth has long been used to support
freedom of speech, and encompasses many of the benefits Emerson feels free
18. Free speech is "among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 570-71 (1942) (citations omitted).
19. KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 4 (1989).
20. Fiss, supra note 17, at 1410.
21. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970).
22. Id. Free speech, by allowing access to all views, assists the continual growth of an indi-
vidual's character and personality. The greater the range of experiences, the more well-rounded
the person. Id.
23. MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 18 (1984).
24. EMERSON, supra note 21, at 6.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 6-7.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 7. Freedom of expression is an essential mechanism for preserving the delicate
balance of stability and change. Id.
29. Id. Revoking this opportunity will foster hostility toward authority groups and may lead
to chaos. Id.
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speech provides to society."0 Justice Holmes expressed these beliefs in his
well-known dissent in Abrams v. United States while discussing the value of
free speech in the marketplace of ideas:
[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-
that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.31
The underlying basis of the "marketplace of ideas" doctrine is that free
speech allows full and fair consideration of all opinions.3 2 Total freedom of
speech fosters rich public debate,33 promoting the discovery of truth by al-
lowing all viable options to be advanced.34 In order to nurture healthy de-
bate and discussion, the marketplace of ideas assumes that there can be no
"false" ideas.3 5 Freedom of speech will not be limited merely because an
idea may be considered wrong or offensive by some. 6
We have no way of knowing what the right results are in advance.
Ideas that were once accepted as truth we now reject. Because our
30. See GREENAWALT, supra note 19, at 174. The belief that free and open discussion pro-
motes knowledge and the discovery of truth finds support as far back as the works of John Locke
and John Stuart Mill.
The steady habit of correcting and completing his own opinion by collating it with those of
others, so far from causing doubt and hesitation in carrying it into practice, is the only
stable foundation for a just reliance on it: for, being cognizant of all that can, at least
obviously, be said against him, and having taken up his position against all gainsayers-
knowing that he has sought for objections and difficulties, instead of avoiding them, and
has shut out no light which can be thrown upon the subject from any quarter-he has a
right to think his judgment better than that of any person, or many multitude, who have
not gone through a similar process.
JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 20 (Alburey Castell et al. eds., 1947).
31. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For further
discussion of the "marketplace of ideas," see generally MILL, supra note 30, at 15-54, and Benja-
min S. Duval, Jr., Free Communication of Ideas and the Quest for Truth: Toward a Teleological
Approach to First Amendment Adjudication, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161 (1972).
In other words, the Framers conceived the First Amendment to facilitate, among other
things, a broadly based and inclusive public discourse. While the free-speech guarantee did
serve to protect unpopular views, those views had value not merely because they were a
part of some individual's self-fulfillment or self-expression; rather, they were important
because they contributed to the vitality and legitimacy of the community's public life.
David Schuman, Our Fixation on Rights is Dysfunctional and Deranged, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Apr. 1, 1992, at B1, B2.
32. Fiss, supra note 17, at 1410.
33. Id.
34. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
35. "[T]he tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor." Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
36. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226
(1983); Matsuda, supra note 3, at 2350.
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ideas about what we want as a society are changing and emergent,
we cannot say that certain ideas are unacceptable. New ideas often
meet opposition, and we have seen new ideas, including major ad-
vances in civil rights, eventually become the majority position. We
have no basis for distinguishing good from bad ideas, and the only
logical choice is to protect all ideas.37
Under the "marketplace of ideas" doctrine, full discussion and analysis
of an opinion by exposing it to opposition is the proper method to address
"wrong" opinions;3" unilaterally branding ideas as unacceptable is not ap-
propriate. This method of discovering the truth is based upon the principle
of equality; all speech must be granted a hearing regardless of the specific
views of the speaker because all opinions are seen as equal in the eyes of the
law.3 9 If the idea can withstand rigorous analysis and debate by its oppo-
nents it will survive, while opprobrious opinions will be discredited by ex-
posing the inherent problems and inconsistencies of the opinion. The
offensiveness of any particular opinion should not alter its treatment in the
marketplace of ideas-it should be forced to stand or fall on its own. This
is especially true when considering the fact that discussion and analysis
tend to strengthen ideas. If an opinion is subject to scrutiny, the holder of
that opinion will attempt to construct answers to anticipated challenges.'
This self-examination forces the holder to address the weak points of the
opinion before being attacked by the opposition. If no opposition exists, the
weak premises of opinions need not be addressed and stagnation will occur.
B. The Dangers of Regulation
Regulating any type of speech poses tremendous dangers by threatening
every benefit provided by freedom of expression.41 Limiting freedom of
speech leads to intellectual pacifism, a "sacrifice of the entire moral courage
of the human mind," and the possibility that today's alleged falsehoods,
37. Matsuda, supra note 3, at 2350.
38. "Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious
an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but
on the competition of other ideas." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40. John Stuart Mill stated: "Truth
gains more even by the errors of one who, with due study and preparation, thinks for himself, than
by the true opinions of those who only hold them because they do not suffer themselves to think."
MILL, supra note 30, at 33.
39. DONALD A. DOWNS, NAZIS IN SKOKIE: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 3 (1985). "[G]overnment may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views
it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial
views." Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
40. See MILL, supra note 30 and accompanying text.
41. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
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which may be the solutions of tomorrow, will be destroyed.42 The individ-
ual personality is seriously violated by any restriction of speech.43 Restrict-
ing free speech necessarily diminishes the overall quality of society because
of the important role free speech plays in the development of individual
character. The ability to freely communicate feelings mandates vigilant
protection of all speech playing a valuable part in personal development;
regulation risks retarding that vital development.'
The regulation of speech in any manner or degree can lead to the stand-
ardization of opinions and ideas.4" Groups in positions of power will be
able to perpetuate their own authority by banning the expression of views
attacking the status quo.46 Democracy cannot survive when certain groups
of people control expression. Certain ideas will be prevented from entering
society-wide discussion, depriving the world of valuable new ideas.47 Ho-
mogeneity in thought will lead to intellectual stagnation. Only by enduring
the availability of all options can society feel confident that the best solution
is chosen.
Although many people argue that we should be able to regulate speech
that the majority of society finds unacceptable, they fail to recognize the
dangers of the "domino effect": "Admitting one exception will lead to an-
other, and yet another, until those in power are free to stifle opposition in
the name of protecting democratic ideals."48 Regulating racist or deroga-
tory speech will begin the treacherous slide down the slippery slope of cen-
sorship. Soon, we may not be able to speak out against those in power; a
42. MILL, supra note 30, at 32. Today's unpopular and revolutionary concepts are many
times tomorrow's generally accepted ideas; speech codes risk losing these ideas. See supra notes
35-37 and accompanying text.
43. EMERSON, supra note 21, at 6. Even racial epithets should be protected; although they do
not add to the marketplace of ideas, their suppression does diminish the marketplace. Breaking
the Codes, supra note 14, at 8.
44. GREENAWALT, supra note 19, at 27-28; see also supra notes 22-29 and accompanying
text.
45. Beliefs will conform to the prevailing opinion at the time. Terminiello v. City of Chicago,
337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949).
[Speech] needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling;
against the tendency of society to impose.., its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct
on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the
formation of any individuality not in harmony with its ways ....
MILL, supra note 30, at 4-5.
46. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
47. It is interesting to think of the many once unpopular views that would not have been
allowed to be discussed: civil rights, women's suffrage, ending the war in Vietnam, the abolition
of slavery, the equality of the sexes, evolution, alternative political parties, and gay rights, to
mention just a few.
48. Matsuda, supra note 3, at 2352.
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situation similar to the one prompting the adoption of the First
Amendment.
C. Content-Based Regulations
Recognizing the risks of suppressing expression, there exists a long
standing belief that speech should not be regulated based merely on its con-
tent,49 even though the content may be offensive, verbally assaultive, and
emotionally painful5 0 Offensive language and verbal disagreements are the
inevitable side effects of the "broader enduring values which the process of
open debate permits us to achieve."51 Unfortunately, abusive language is
frequently part of strong disagreements between individuals about ideas
each holds closely. However, the First Amendment requires toleration of a
multitude of these painful words 2 because the risks to First Amendment
benefits are too great to allow regulation of offensive speech.53 The content
of offensive speech can be regulated only when the harm of the speech out-
weighs the risks to First Amendment benefits. This occurs when speech
49. Content-based regulations limit speech because of the message conveyed while content-
neutral regulations limit without regard to the message expressed. UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of
Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1173-74 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (citations omitted).
[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. To permit the
continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each indi-
vidual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government
censorship. The essence of this forbidden censorship is content control. Any restriction on
expressive activity because of its content would completely undercut the "profound na-
tional commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open."
Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (citations omitted).
"[I]f the first amendment means anything it is that the level of constitutional protection cannot
vary on the basis of differing viewpoints." REDISH, supra note 23, at 42; see also Texas v. John-
son, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972);
Cohen, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Terminiello v. City of Chi-
cago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (prohibiting content-based regulations).
The Supreme Court has regularly held that regulations punishing speech solely on the grounds
that it is offensive are unconstitutionally overbroad. See, e.g., Street, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Tenni-
niello, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d
1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (stating regulation cannot be based on offensive-
ness alone). "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the gov-
ernment may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414 (citations omitted).
50. DOWNS, supra note 39, at 2.
51. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
52. GREENAWALT, supra note 19, at 296.
53. "The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that offensive language causes
such severe emotional distress to the hearer that it should be deprived of first amendment protec-
tion." Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531, 577-78 (1980).
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physically interferes with other legitimate activities, when it is forced upon
a captive audience, or when it directly incites unlawful behavior that is
likely to occur.54
If speech is regulated merely because it is offensive, the unavoidable
vagueness of an "offensive" standard will lead to the imposition of judges'
specific subjective preferences and opinions about what is acceptable."5 The
"government has no acceptable criteria for distinguishing between valuable
and worthless speech." 56 Therefore, regulating "offensive" speech will nec-
essarily limit the participation in public discourse of people for whom such
speech is acceptable.5 7 Therefore, we must ask who is qualified to deter-
mine what is acceptable and whether we are willing to invest this decision in
our judiciary.58
D. The "Fighting Words" Doctrine
The previous discussion appears to assert that all speech is protected by
the First Amendment. Although there are First Amendment absolutists
who believe that all speech should be allowed, the Supreme Court, and
54. DowNs, supra note 39, at 2 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)). Content-
based regulations should not be enacted without long deliberation. They must be viewed with the
concern that this type of regulation is the most direct threat to the survival of the First Amend-
ment right of freedom of expression. Cohin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1202 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 916 (1978). Content-based regulations must be viewed with much stricter scrutiny than
content-neutral regulations. GREENAWALT, supra note 19, at 225.
55. Gard, supra note 53, at 578. The ability of judges to make a determination of offensive-
ness is dangerous and will lead to a mixed bag of definitions because of the great differences in
subjective feelings about what is offensive. The argument that we should not be subject to hearing
offensive language outside of our homes could easily lead to a majority silencing a minority group.
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21. What is offensive in one setting may be considered crude humor in anQther
and what is considered offensive changes greatly over time. GREENAWALT, supra note 19, at 283.
56. J. Peter Byrne, Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University, 79 GEO. L.J. 399,
402-03 (1991).
57. HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 109
(Jamie Kalven ed., 1988) (citing Justice Harlan).
58. Judges as a group cannot be said to accurately represent the makeup of society. There-
fore, judges will be able to impose the values and views of a certain segment of society on an
increasingly diverse population. This is not an ideal situation. The public in general, not a limited
class of judges, must be allowed to determine what all of society desires. See, e.g., Skywalker
Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (a federal judge, acting as trier of fact,
applied "contemporary community standards" and determined a rap group's album to be obscene,
even though the album was extremely successful), rev'd, 960 F.2d 134 (S.D. Fla. 1990),petition for
cert. filed (Oct. 16, 1992). Ira Glasser, national executive director of the American Civil Liberties
Union, stated: "We live in a racist society, which is why you can't trust the people in power to
make distinctions about which speech should be permitted." Wiener, supra note 11, at 274.
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much of society, has decided that there are several types of speech which
may be prohibited or regulated:59
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fight-
ing" words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.'
Regulation of speech is allowed when it prevents the speaker from vo-
cally inciting listeners to commit illegal acts or it prevents the speaker from
inciting an immediate violent reaction. 61 In Brandenburg v. Ohio,6 2 regula-
tion of speech inciting illegal activities was permitted. The fighting words
doctrine evolved in response to the latter danger-inciting an immediate
violent reaction.
The fighting words doctrine was formulated in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire.63 Mr. Chaplinsky, a member of Jehovah's Witnesses, was
handing out literature at a busy street corner on a Saturday afternoon. Sev-
eral citizens noticed Mr. Chaplinsky and complained to the local police that
he was criticizing all religions by calling them "rackets." The police
warned Chaplinsky that the crowd was becoming restless as a result of his
actions. Soon after, a disturbance occurred causing the police to remove
Chaplinsky from the street corner. Mr. Chaplinsky was thereafter con-
victed of violating an ordinance that made it illegal to address another per-
son on the street with offensive, derisive, or annoying words because he was
heard to say: "'You are a God damned racketeer' and 'a damned Fascist
and the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of
Fascists.' "'
The Court held that speech may be regulated if its very utterance tends
to incite an immediate breach of the peace65 because such speech does not
59. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
60. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (footnote omitted).
61. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 591 (1969).
There are limits to the exercise of these liberties. The danger in these times from the
coercive activities of those who in the delusion of racial or religious conceit would incite
violence and breaches of the peace in order to deprive others of their equal right to the
exercise of their liberties, is emphasized by events familiar to all. These and other trans-
gressions of those limits the States appropriately may punish.
Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310.
62. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (footnote omitted).
63. 315 U.S. at 571-72.
64. Id. at 569-70.
65. Id.
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have enough value to merit First Amendment protection. 6 "Fighting
words" have little social value and do not play an important role in the
exposition of ideas.67
Fighting words are "those personally abusive epithets which... are...
inherently likely to provoke violent reaction."68 The spoken words must
create the "likelihood of an immediate, violent, reflexive response by the
recipient"69 and unless the words incite an immediate breach of peace they
do not fall within the fighting words category.7 0 Therefore, a "serious" of-
fense does not rise to the level of breaching the peace and cannot be regu-
lated.71 A mere potential for a breach of peace is not sufficient to bring the
comments within the scope of the fighting words doctrine.72 Fortunately,
every expression of a diverse and provocative idea cannot be assumed to
cause a breach of the peace. Courts must closely examine the circum-
stances surrounding the speech.73
The Supreme Court weakened the original fighting words doctrine
found in Chaplinsky by extending procedural justice and actively applying
the content-neutrality standard to many types of speech.74 The first half of
the Chaplinsky definition was discarded; the fact that the speech causes in-
jury is no longer sufficient to bring the language within the scope of fighting
words.7" Therefore, to fall within the fighting words category, speech must
be an extremely provocative personal insult76 addressed to an individual77
in a face-to-face encounter7 8 tending to cause an immediate violent reaction
and breach of peace by an average hearer.79
66. Id. at 572.
67. Id
68. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (citation omitted).
69. Gard, supra note 53, at 551 (requiring an uncontrollable violent impulse).
70. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 133 (1974); see also Gooding v. Wilson, 405
U.S. 518, 522-23 (1972); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1203 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916
(1978). The breach of peace test is objective: "The test is what men of common intelligence would
understand would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight." Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at
573. Justice Harlan refused to extend the fighting words doctrine to justify censorship of offensive
speech. KALVEN, supra note 57, at 110.
71. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 401 (1989) (citation omitted).
72. The words must be regarded by a reasonable onlooker as a "direct personal insult or an
invitation to exchange fisticuffs." Id at 409 (citations omitted).
73. Id.
74. DowNs, supra note 39, at 8. Procedural guarantees were extended by upholding equal
opportunity for diverse viewpoints and content-neutrality.
75. See UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1169-70 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
76. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
77. Id.; see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
78. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572; KALVEN, supra note 57, at 79.
79. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
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III. THE UWM POST DECISION
In May of 1988, the University of Wisconsin Board of Regents, in re-
sponse to urgent pleas for action following the divisive racial incidents on
campus, adopted "Design for Diversity."8 ° This plan intended to address
racial problems on a broad scale in a variety of areas by increasing minority
representation in the University of Wisconsin system, and fostering greater
understanding of minorities on campus.8 ' A "hate speech" provision
prohibiting certain types of speech was included as part of the plan to assist
in solving the divisive problems on University of Wisconsin campuses. The
regulation was UWS-17 (the "UW Rule")."2
80. UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1164 (E.D. Wis. 1991). "De-
sign for Diversity" was a plan to address broad problems present on University of Wisconsin
system campuses. These included low minority enrollment, low minority graduation rates, defi-
cient minority representation on faculty and staff, and lack of minority experience classes. Metz,
supra note 6, at 37.
81. UWM Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1164.
82. Wis. ADMIN. CODE § UWS 17.06 (Aug. 1989). UWS 17.06 Offenses Defined.
The university may discipline a student in non-academic matters in the following
situations.
(2)(a) For racist or discriminatory comments, epithets or other expressive behavior di-
rected at an individual or on separate occasions at different individuals, or for physical
conduct, if such comments, epithets, other expressive behavior or physical conduct
intentionally:
1. Demean the race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual orientation, national ori-
gin, ancestry or age of the individual or individuals; and
2. Create an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for education, university
related work, or other university-authorized activity.
(b) Whether the intent required under par. (a) is present shall be determined by consid-
eration of all relevant circumstances.
(c) In order to illustrate the types of conduct which this subsection is designed to
cover, the following examples are set forth. These examples are not meant to illustrate the
only situations or types of conduct intended to be covered.
I. A student would be in violation if:
a. He or she intentionally made demeaning remarks to an individual based on that
person's ethnicity, such as name calling, racial slurs, or "jokes"; and
b. His or her purpose in uttering the remarks was to make the educational environ-
ment hostile for the person to whom the demeaning remark was addressed.
2. A student would be in violation if:
a. He or she intentionally placed visual or written material demeaning the race or sex
of an individual in that person's university living quarters or work area; and
b. His or her purpose was to make the educational environment hostile for the person
in whose quarters or work area the material was placed.
3. A student would be in violation if he or she seriously damaged or destroyed private
property of any member of the university community or guest because of that person's
race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual orientation, national origin, ancestry or
age.
4. A student would not be in violation if, during a class discussion, he or she ex-
pressed a derogatory opinion concerning a racial or ethnic group. There is no violation,
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Thirty-five students in the University of Wisconsin system were disci-
plined under UWS-17. 3 A group of students and the UWM Post, Inc., a
Milwaukee campus student newspaper, brought suit against the Board of
Regents on the basis that the UW Rule violated free speech rights guaran-
teed by the constitutions of the United States and Wisconsin.8 4
The plaintiffs first argued that the UW Rule was overbroad on its face
and therefore invalid.85 It is well settled that in order to avoid being over-
broad, regulations attempting to limit freedom of speech must be narrowly
drawn and address specific language.86 The plaintiffs' overbreadth argu-
ment rested on the fact that the UW Rule was content based and regulated
a large amount of protected speech.87 The court agreed that the First
Amendment generally protects speech from content-based regulation,88 but
stated that there are certain categories of speech, including fighting words,
not deserving First Amendment protection which may be regulated.89
When considering the overbreadth argument, the court recalled that the
since the student's remark was addressed to the class as a whole, not to a specific individ-
ual. Moreover, on the facts as stated, there seems no evidence that the student's purpose
was to create a hostile environment.
Id
Several UW-Madison Law School professors assisted in the drafting of the rule and agreed
that the proposed rule would withstand First Amendment challenges with the requirement that
the speaker intend to make the educational environment hostile for a particular individual. UWM
Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1165.
83. Steve Schultze, Regents May Block Hate-Speech Rule, MILWAUKEE J., Feb. 27, 1992, at
A12. The offenses included: (1) a student called another student a "Shakazulu"; (2) a student
called a female student a "fucking bitch" and a "fucking cunt"; (3) a student yelled to another:
"It's people like you - that's the reason this country is screwed up" and "you don't belong here";
(4) a student harassed another by dressing up as an immigration officer and demanded to see a
student's immigration papers; (5) a student called two students a "piece of shit nigger" and a
"South American immigrant"; (6) a student sent a computer message stating "Death to all Arabs!!
Die Islamic scumbags!"; (7) a student stole his roommate's ATM card, PIN number, and money
from his roommate's account, admitting the crime was racially motivated; (8) a student called
another a "fat-ass nigger"; and (9) a male student yelled to a female "you've got nice tits." UWM
Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1167-68.
84. UWM Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1164.
85. Id. at 1168.
86. Id. (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611 (1973)); see also Police Dep't v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). "It has long been
recognized that the First Amendment needs breathing space and that statutes attempting to re-
strict or burden the exercise of First Amendment rights must be narrowly drawn . ... "
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 611. Statutes dealing with the First Amendment must be "narrowly tai-
lored to their legitimate objectives." Mosley, 408 U.S. at 101 (citations omitted). The statute must
be substantially overbroad in order to be invalidated on its face. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 769-70 (1982).
87. UWM Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1168-69.
88. Id. at 1169 (citation omitted).
89. Id. (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
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scope of the fighting words exception was narrowed to include only the
second half of the fighting words definition found in Chaplinsky.90 In order
to fulfill the second part of the definition, fighting words must be directed at
a specific individual, "naturally tend to provoke violent resentment," and
tend to incite an immediate breach of peace. 91
Turning to the facts, the court determined that although the UW Rule
does require the speech to be directed at an individual, it fails to require the
speech in question to, by its very utterance, tend to incite violent reaction
and is therefore overbroad. 92 Speech demeaning a person's characteristics
may be spoken without inciting the individual to violence.9 3 Derogatory
language denigrating an individual's personal characteristics may harm the
individual in some manner, but it does not necessarily provoke violent retal-
iation.94 Nor does the UW Rule's requirement of a hostile environment
necessarily mean that the language will incite a violent reaction.9"
Although a portion of the speech covered by the UW Rule may in fact
incite violence, the Rule regulates speech regardless of whether it is likely to
cause such a response. It is highly improbable that all of the covered speech
would cause violence96 and because the UW Rule covers numerous non-
violent situations, the court determined that the UW Rule fails to fulfill the
requirements of the fighting words doctrine.97
90. The two-part test is: (1) words that by their very utterance inflict injury and (2) words
that by their very utterance tend to incite an immediate breach of peace. UWM Post, 774 F. Supp.
at 1169-70. The court also determined that the court in Chaplinsky, although a two-part test was
formulated, applied only the second part of the definition. Id. at 1170.
91. Id. at 1170. A breach of peace must tend to bring the addressee to exchange "fisticuffs."
Id. at 1171 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989)).
92. The UW Rule can be applied to many instances when a violent reaction and a breach of
peace is not imminent. Id. at 1172.
93. Id.
94. This is seen on a daily basis. People constantly insult others, but not all of these insults
result in violent confrontations.
95. An intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment does not always tend to incite a
breach of peace and can encompass both violent and nonviolent situations. UWM Post, 774 F.
Supp. at 1172-73.
96. Id. at 1173.
97. "Since the UW Rule covers a substantial number of situations where no breach of the
peace is likely to result, the rule fails to meet the requirements of the fighting words doctrine." Id.
The University of Wisconsin system attempted to resurrect UWS-17 by modifying the rule to
reflect the requirements of the fighting words doctrine. The rule was redrafted to include the
provision that the speech must "tend to provoke an immediate violent response when addressed
directly to a person of average sensibility." UW Rewriting Failed 'Hate Speech' Rule, MILWAU-
KEE SENTINEL, Feb. 24, 1992, at 10A. The new hate speech rule that may have passed constitu-
tional muster has been repealed and revoked by the Board of Regents. University of Wisconsin
Repeals Ban on 'Hate Speech,' N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1992, at A10.
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The Board of Regents argued that a balancing test should be applied: If
the social value of the words is minimal compared with the harm caused,
the speech may be suppressed. 8 Although this approach is tempting, the
court reminded the Board that the balancing approach applies only in con-
tent-neutral regulations while the UW Rule is a content-based regulation.99
However, the court determined that even if the balancing test had been
applied, the Rule would remain unconstitutional."°°
The Board of Regents proposed that the regulated speech lacks social
value because it is not intended to inform or convince the listener, it is not
likely to be a part of any dialogue or exchange of views, it does not allow an
opportunity to reply to the speech, it is a type of verbal assault on the
hearer, and it will most likely invoke a response. 101 In addressing the argu-
ments of the Board of Regents, the court stated that hate speech does in-
form the hearer; the comments inform the hearer of the speaker's racist
attitudes.10 2 In response to the argument that hate speech will not be a part
of a dialogue or exchange of ideas and will not allow a reply, the court
stated that this is not a requirement for First Amendment protection.1 0 3
The Regents' argument that such speech is a verbal assault does not carry
great weight because the Supreme Court has applied the balancing test with
respect to injury-inflicting speech and has determined that the First
Amendment protects such speech."m Additionally, the fact that speech in-
cites a reaction does not strip it of its First Amendment protection.10 5 In
order for the regulation to be constitutional, the reaction invoked must be a
violent one. 106
The court further invalidated the rule on the basis that the regulated
speech is protected because of its emotive function as an expression of the
speaker's feelings and emotions.107 This justification for protecting offen-
sive speech is that the emotive function of speech is protected in addition to
98. UWM Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1173. The Board felt the speech regulated had harmful
effects that substantially outweighed the minimal social value of such speech. Id.
99. Id. (citing American Bookseller Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475
U.S. 1001 (1986)).
100. Id. at 1174.
101. Id
102. Id. at 1175.
103. Id. (citing American Bookseller, 771 F.2d at 330, and Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214
(1966)).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971)). Actually, most of the speech
contemplated by the UW Rule involves speech that expresses the feelings of the speaker regarding
the race, gender, or religion of the addressee. Id.
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the cognitive content. 108 Abusive words, although offensive, express strong
emotions and make vague assertions about the particular speaker's values
and attitudes." 9 Free speech is a necessary emotional outlet and plays a
valuable part in the development of individual personality:110 "We have
not yet reached the point where we have taken from individuals the right to
be prejudiced .... "I
The Board of Regents argued that several compelling interests were
served by the UW Rule: increasing minority representation, assuring equal
educational opportunities, preventing the interruption of educational activi-
ties, and preserving a safe and orderly campus for all students. 112 The court
acknowledged the importance of these interests, but was troubled by the
alleged relation of the speech regulation to the interests.113 The court felt
that the UW Rule actually limits diversity by reducing the variety of ideas
available to students. 14 Educational opportunities may already be equal
and the Regents failed to provide any evidence that students were not edu-
cated on equal terms. 115 With respect to the interruption of educational
activities, the University can place reasonable time and place restrictions on
students' speech without regulating the content of the speech. 1 6 As to the
safety of the campus, the First Amendment allows certain injurious words
regardless of the harm caused and most of the contemplated confrontations
will not result in violence.117 If the words do incite violence, they will fall
within the fighting words doctrine and can be regulated." 8 None of the
interests have a close enough relationship to freedom of expression to justify
the broad limitations applied by the Board of Regents' rule.119
108. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
109. GREENAWALT, supra note 19, at 292.
110. Id. at 175; see also supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. Driving feelings of hatred
and intolerance underground will accomplish absolutely nothing. Speech allows the speaker to
verbally release steam and pent up emotions, which is more desirable than a violent confrontation.
But see Byrne, supra note 56, at 419 (stating that such speech does relieve the speaker's tension,
but increases tension within the audience).
111. Howard v. National Cash Register Co., 388 F. Supp. 603, 606 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
112. UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1176 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513
(1969)).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1176-77. The plaintiffs also successfully argued that the UW Rule was unduly
vague. Id. at 1178-80.
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The court concluded by acknowledging that some speech may in fact
cause harm, but the value of free expression mandates that the speech be
protected:
The problems of bigotry and discrimination sought to be addressed
here are real and truly corrosive of the educational environment.
But freedom of speech is almost absolute in our land and the only
restriction the fighting words doctrine can abide is that based on the
fear of violent reaction. Content-based prohibitions such as that in
the UW Rule, however well intended, simply cannot survive the
screening which our Constitution demands.120
IV. SPEECH REGULATION AND UNIVERSITIES
4. Private vs. Public Universities
Public universities are not alone in enacting speech codes. Many private
schools have followed suit.21 However, there is a huge difference in effect;
private universities are not subject to First Amendment free speech princi-
ples applied to public colleges by the Fourteenth Amendment. 22 Private
educational institutions are basically immune from free speech chal-
lenges.' 2 3 Students attending public schools enjoy broad substantive and
procedural constitutional rights with respect to the institution they are at-
tending while students at private institutions can be deprived of these fun-
damental rights.'2 4 The considerable gap in the rights enjoyed by public
and private students has no real justification other than the absence of state
action.12 5  Educational institutions, whether public or private, serve the
same basic purposes; 26 faculty, curricula, facilities, extra-curricular activi-
ties, and experiences offered are all similar. Minor differences in the partic-
ular educational approaches and the specific philosophies of the schools
exist, but the main goal of schools, whether private or public, is education
120. Id. at 1181.
121. Campbell, supra note 10, at 2.
122. See Carol Innerst, "Political Correctness" Bashed from Right, Left, WASH. TIMES, Mar.
13, 1991, at Al (quoting Nadine Strossen, President of the ACLU).
123. Private colleges have a greater ability to regulate the speech of the students attending the
institution. Scott Jaschik, Campus "Hate Speech" Codes in Doubt After High Court Rejects a City
Ordinance, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 1, 1992, at A19.
124. J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment, " 99
YALE L.J. 251, 299 (1989).
125. Id. at 299. Although private institutions are not legally obligated to provide free speech
protection, they have just as high of a moral duty to protect free speech as public institutions have.
Breaking the Codes, supra note 14, at 8.
126. Byrne, supra note 124, at 299. "Virtually all schools tend to mirror consensual values
and to promote the rules of the game." MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLI-
TICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 230 (1983).
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by the free exchange of ideas and opinions. Why, then, should public
school students receive greater free speech protection and opportunities?
Why should a speech regulation be unconstitutional at UW-Madison, but
perfectly allowable at Marquette University Law School?127
Several methods have been proposed to provide First Amendment pro-
tection to students attending private institutions. Some believe state consti-
tutions guarantee freedom of speech at private institutions. 128 Others rely
on the courts to categorize private schools as state actors, thereby forcing
the schools to provide First Amendment protection. 129 United States
Representative Henry Hyde followed a different path by introducing a bill
in Congress that would ban hate speech regulations at private
universities. 130
However, these methods should be unnecessary. Every institution of
higher learning, whether public or private, owes a moral duty to its students
to vigorously protect all speech, no matter how unpopular, in order to pro-
vide the best possible educational atmosphere.13 1 The university setting re-
quires greater adherence to free speech than society in general. 132 Speech
regulations are totally incompatible with the goals and missions of schools
and universities.1 33 Universities, as the "bastions of free thought," should
energetically defend the right to free speech. 1 4 The goal of every college is
127. Marquette's rule has been used but has not yet been challenged in court. See infra notes
148-50 and accompanying text.
128. UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1164 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
129. Mindy A. Kaiden, Note, Albert v. Carovano: The Second Circuit Redefines Under Color
of State Law for Private Universities, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 239, 240 (1989). Courts have held private
parties to be state actors for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. Id. It is conceivable to find "state
action" at a private school after examining the particular relationship of the institution to the
state. Close relations between the state and the school enable the court to find "state action" by
the private institution, thus applying freedom of speech and expression to the private school.
Extensive state funding of the private school is one of the relationships that could transform the
private school into a state actor. If private schools are closely related to formal government,
"state action" can be found, ensuring the students' right of free speech. EMERSON, supra note 21,
at 676. See generally id. at 675-96 (discussing protection of free speech in private organizations).
130. Campbell, supra note 10, at 2; Innerst, supra note 122, at Al.
131. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
132. "These principles acquire a special significance in the university setting, where the free
and unfettered interplay of competing views is essential to the institution's educational mission."
Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 863 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (citation omitted) (striking
down the University of Michigan's speech regulations).
133. Charles Lawrence & Gerald Gunther, Good Speech, Bad Speech, 42 STAN. L. REV. 4, 7
(1990) (two author article arguing for and against hate speech codes).
134. Id.; see also Delgado, supra note 6, at 359. Others propose that a university should have
less authority to limit speech because institutions of higher education should be devoted to free
speech. See Byrne, supra note 56, at 415 (citation omitted) (the overall thrust of the article was to
justify hate speech rules). "'As much as hateful speech represents an idea, however abhorrent,
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to prepare students for the "real world." This is best accomplished by pro-
moting the pursuit of knowledge and truth by the consideration of diverse
opinions and the free and unfettered exchange of ideas. This means that
unpopular and controversial ideas must be tolerated and perhaps even en-
couraged. Free speech allows students to consider diverse and competing
positions, thereby promoting independent judgment and informed decision-
making,135 which are vital prerequisites for a quality college education.
Students need an unregulated, free flow of information to assist in making
decisions affecting their lives. 36 The suppression of ideas retards the devel-
opment of the mind which can in no way be desirable.137
The American college experience is the ultimate marketplace of ideas, 38
one where anyone should be able to speak his or her mind without fear of
censorship. Most speakers expect, and usually welcome, opposition by an-
other holding different views on the subject-this is a vital part of the learn-
ing process.1 39  Each opinion is expected to be analyzed closely by
exhaustive discussion and debate. Institutions of higher learning should
teach students to critically analyze problems and formulate creative solu-
tions by considering all viable options. Unchallenged ideas tend to become
static and are often easily discredited because they have not been thor-
oughly constructed. If an idea is likely to be challenged, the speaker con-
templates how to answer those challenges and strengthens and improves the
idea in the process. This idealistic process of education has been shattered
by speech codes, and the shards of the First Amendment protection of free
speech lay scattered about the commons of universities and colleges across
the university community is not a place where we should suppress ideas."' Jasehik, supra note
123, at A22 (quoting Robert O'Neil, Director, University of Virginia Thomas Jefferson Center for
the Protection of Free Expression).
135. GREENAWALT, supra note 19, at 26. Open discussion and an open forum for all view-
points is crucial. THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 9 (1966).
136. REDISH, supra note 23, at 47. "[I]n spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these
liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the
citizens of a democracy." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
137. EMERSON, supra note 135, at 4-5.
138. "The classroom is peculiarly 'the marketplace of ideas.'" Keyishian v. Board of Re-
gents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). "[The ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competi-
tion of the market .... .. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
139. By being exposed to an opposing view, students may be informed of the weakness of
their opinions. Once informed of that weakness, a student is able to improve the opinion by
addressing that weakness. Inconsistent and illogical arguments are exposed by opposing view-
points. Deficiencies in otherwise valid and helpful ideas will be obvious and can be remedied,
increasing the overall quality and value of the idea.
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the country. How can students be expected to learn anything if they are
unable to speak freely?1"
The Supreme Court realized the potential danger of university-regulated
speech: "By establishing content-based restrictions on speech, the rule lim-
its the diversity of ideas among students and thereby prevents the 'robust
exchange of ideas' which intellectually diverse campuses provide."1 41
America's universities are the classrooms of our country's future leaders,
making it essential to the continuing survival of our country that our lead-
ers receive the best education possible. Limiting the ideas available to to-
day's students will inevitably lead to the degeneration of the quality of life
in our country.
Freedom of expression is vital to the survival and success of our country
and the world; without freedom of expression students cannot receive a
quality education. A limited education for the next generation will cause
far-reaching problems because the leaders of tomorrow will be unable to
adequately address the problems facing them. Provocative ideas, although
frequently unpopular, often provide the foundation for novel solutions. By
depriving students of the opportunity to discuss all options, we run the risk
of haphazardly discarding valid and important solutions to pressing
problems. We must trust our students to make intelligent and well-rea-
soned decisions when presented with difficult situations. They will eventu-
ally have to do this every day of their lives and protecting them from
unpopular ideas through the regulation of speech will only serve to ill-pre-
pare them for the world after graduation.
B. The Special Duty of Law Schools
Law schools should be even more deeply committed to protecting
speech. Restricting discussion of any issue is contrary to everything that a
law school is.142 A law school's mission is to prepare its students to be
guardians of the law by developing the essential skills necessary to be com-
petent attorneys. Law schools must actively encourage students to form
well-reasoned opinions and assist them in competently arguing on behalf of
those beliefs. 143 An atmosphere of free and full debate is indispensable to
140. Emerson, supra note 10, at 18.
141. UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1176 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (citing
University of Calif. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978)).
142. Jane E. Bahls, Dissenting Opinions, STUDENT LAW., Sept. 1991, at 12, 12. Law school is
an institution of intellectual inquiry where ideas must be examined carefully before determining
the appropriateness and acceptability of controversial issues. Id.
143. Id. at 18.
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the accomplishment of this goal. 1" In an environment where free expres-
sion is restricted, law students will be unable to obtain the crucial advocacy
skills that help ensure that justice prevails.145 Inadequately developed ana-
lytical skills, as a result of the limited environment, will lead to a generation
of ill-prepared lawyers.
Attorneys cannot always choose their client or their client's opinions.
This fact, coupled with the basic tenet of our judicial system that everyone,
no matter what opinion he or she holds, has a right to representation, poses
a troubling problem when law students are taught in an institution that
restricts speech based on its content. Attorneys are expected to be advo-
cates for their clients,146 but cannot effectively argue on behalf of their cli-
ents' interests if they were not able to discuss and critically analyze all
competing opinions in law school. By teaching law students that certain
opinions are unacceptable, we are effectively denying use of the legal system
to that part of society holding "undesirable" opinions. Law schools do not
forward the interests of justice by teaching students that certain opinions,
because they are deemed unacceptable by some, do not deserve the same
protection afforded to "acceptable" opinions.
1. The Unique Problem at Wisconsin Law Schools
Speech regulation is extremely problematic at Wisconsin law schools
because of the existence of the diploma privilege; students graduating from
Wisconsin law schools are automatically admitted to the Wisconsin bar.147
An education at Marquette University Law School or UW-Madison Law
School must competently prepare law students to become active and pro-
ductive members of the bar. This level of competence is difficult to support
when the schools limit the ideas available for discussion. Students cannot
competently argue on behalf of their beliefs, and therefore their future cli-
ents, if those beliefs are stifled and suppressed in law school. Students' ad-
vocacy skills may be deficient, harming future clients and society as a
whole, proving to be yet another cost of restricting speech in educational
settings.
144. Id.; see supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
145. Bahls, supra note 142, at 14.
146. "As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the ad-
versary system." Wis. Sup. Cr. R. Preamble (West 1991).
147. Wis. Sup. Cr. R. 40.02(2), 40.03 (West 1991). Students at Wisconsin law schools are
automatically admitted to the Wisconsin bar upon graduation. Admission to the bar requires
legal competence, which a state law school education is supposed to fulfill.
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2. Marquette University Law School's Approach
Marquette University Law School sets forth its educational philosophy
in a handbook given to prospective students and boasts that "[b]ecause it is
a university, Marquette is committed unreservedly to open and free in-
quiry. ' 148 In addition:
The Law School recognizes that the rules of law must be studied and
training must be given in the power to analyze and critically review
legal reasoning. A depth and range of training is sought beyond the
learning of rules. The approach is to study rules in terms of the
social scheme which they presume to regulate and to implant an un-
derstanding of the jurisprudential underpinnings of the rules, as well
as the pervasive relevancy of ethical and moral issues, and to arouse
an interest in the development of law and its usefulness in solving
economic and social problems. 149
Unfortunately, Marquette Law School fails to fulfill the promises set forth
in its handbook. 5 ' By instituting a rule restricting speech based on its of-
fensiveness, the Law School fails to fulfill its obligation to provide the best
atmosphere for education. An atmosphere in which students are apprehen-
sive about speaking their mind is not conducive to scholarly innovation or
discussion. Students holding unpopular beliefs will be hampered in their
efforts to gain the promised education. The ideal educational atmosphere is
one where everyone is able to freely express their thoughts and feelings.
Students can critically select the best solution when presented with all op-
tions. Critical analysis and review of legal reasoning inherently encom-
passes review of all possibilities, not merely the ones deemed appropriate,
and cannot be accomplished if certain types of reasoning are banned.
148. MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY, supra note 1, at 13. The handbook assures that "[t]he Law
School aims to provide a climate which will encourage scholarly productivity by the faculty and
students." Id. at 6. It is interesting to note that the 1991-1992 edition does not include this
statement.
149. Id. at 5. The 1991-1992 edition does not include this statement either.
150. Marquette University Law School recently added a speech regulation to its academic
regulations. Marquette University Law School Academic Regulations § 802 (1991).
Section 802. Offenses
The following shall constitute offenses subject to discipline under Section 801.
(7) Racial, gender, religious, sexual preference, or political harassment, defined as verbal,
written or physical conduct which has the purpose or effect of intimidating or creating an
environment hostile to a person or a group on account of color, race, national origin,
ethnicity, sex, sexual preference, or religious or political affiliation or views. This offense
includes any unwarranted and unwelcome sexual advance. This offense does not include
sincere, vigorous intellectual debate over issues relating to race, gender, sexual preference,
religion or politics in which the views of all members of the Law School community are
accorded respectful treatment on their merits.
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There is a great deal of intolerance in today's society. This fact cannot
be ignored when formulating public policy or anticipating litigation. Intol-
erance simply cannot be ignored and expected to disappear; the problems
need to be acknowledged and addressed in order to produce effective policy
solutions. Repressing views does not solve the problem, but merely curtails
minor symptoms and prevents true discussion of real solutions.
C. The Reality of the Regulations
In addition to all of the problems speech regulations cause, the harsh
reality of speech codes is that they fail to accomplish the intended results.
Ironically, most of the regulations now in place fail to apply to the problems
prompting their adoption. For example, the UW Rule could not be used to
punish the fraternity members who participated in the slave auction or who
interrupted the African Studies classes."' 1 This insensitive and insulting be-
havior was addressed to a group, not an individual and, therefore, would
not fall within the scope of the UW Rule and would not be punishable. An
alarming number of racial incidents on campus are not punishable under
the existing codes and will continue to flourish. Minority groups will re-
main the target of intolerance and may feel that college administrators have
failed to adequately address the problem. Therefore, minority groups may
feel persecuted not only by the insensitive students, but by the college as
well for failing to implement a successful solution. Hate speech codes may
do no more than further alienate minority groups.
The codes may in fact do more harm than good by taking the focus
away from the real problems; speech codes merely attack the symptoms of
the problems rather than addressing the root causes.152 "Codes suppress
the words without exploring and combatting the lazy and irrational think-
ing that spawns prejudice based on ethnicity, religion or sex .... It does no
good to attempt to cure one kind of intolerance with another." '153
Another unsettling, potential problem is that the very groups of people
the speech codes were meant to protect will be the most persecuted under
151. Emerson, supra note 10, at 19. It is interesting to note that most of the students disci-
plined were not enrolled at the Madison campus where the greatest protest was raised. See supra
note 83 and accompanying text.
152. Campbell, supra note 10, at 2 (quoting Bob Purvis of the National Institute Against
Prejudice and Violence who stated that the controversy about speech codes has distracted atten-
tion from "many of the more deep-seated problems that gave rise to the tensions in the first
place").
153. Fighting Intolerance with Intolerant Speech Codes: Campuses Need to Address the Causes
of Prejudice, Not Only Symptoms, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 1991, at B4.
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the regulations.154 Ira Glasser, the national executive director of the
ACLU, believes that African-Americans will probably be victims of the
very speech regulations meant to protect them. 155
It has been argued that any limitations, including those punishing face-
to-face insults, may chill academic exchange and teaching.15 6 Discussion in
law school classrooms will be inhibited as a result of the codes.' 5 7 It will be
difficult to analyze and discuss controversial cases, such as affirmative ac-
tion and set-aside cases, when students fear offending minority students. 158
This is extremely detrimental because new solutions will no longer be intro-
duced for fear of offending someone. 5 9
The insurmountable obstacle of obtaining a workable definition of racist
or derogatory speech"s° poses extreme line drawing problems. Many words
have the potential for inflicting injury, but a motive other than harm is
usually responsible for the comment. Many speakers may have ignorant
views about other races and are merely expressing that view.16 ' Everyone
agrees that hate speech and racial epithets cause psychological and emo-
tional harm; 62 however, many nonracial comments are just as capable of
inflicting emotional trauma. Derogatory comments about a person's
weight, complexion, intelligence, or other personal attributes may injure the
person, but does that mandate restriction of all derogatory speech?163 If we
start restricting the ability to criticize, citizens will be unable to criticize the
government, politicians, and others in positions of power.'6 Regulation of
154. The University of Michigan disproportionately enforced its speech regulations against
the very minority groups it was intended to protect. Innerst, supra note 122, at Al.
155. Wiener, supra note 11, at 274.
156. Delgado, supra note 6, at 359.
157. Metz, supra note 6, at 37.
158. Id.
159. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
160. R. GEORGE WRIGHT, THE FUTURE OF FREE SPEECH LAW 78 (1990).
161. GREENAWALT, supra note 19, at 297. "We have not yet reached the point where we
have taken from individuals the right to be prejudiced." Howard v. National Cash Register Co.,
388 F. Supp. 603, 606 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
162. The actual words and comments injure the hearer and tolerance of such speech causes
additional emotional injury. Matsuda, supra note 3, at 2337-38.
163. We are not a society that compels everyone to like one another or be nice to each other.
Our government has always been an adversarial one, with checks and balances limiting the powers
of each arm of government. Our legal system is adversarial in nature. Everyday life requires the
tolerance of many painful and insensitive remarks. Though the rough edges of society have yet to
be smoothed, speech codes should not serve as the sandpaper.
164. By restricting criticism of certain individuals, parties in power will limit the ability to
criticize the party in power. Groups will remain in power by the use of fear tactics and restricting
discussion about what is wrong with the ruling power; exactly the spark for adopting the First
Amendment. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
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speech serves only to silence the verbal cacophony of ignorance. The vapid
thoughts of hatred will only be submerged temporarily, festering and multi-
plying, preparing to erupt as actions and deeds much worse than mere
words and language.1 61
D. Options for a Solution
It is interesting to note the enigma of free speech in modem society.
Free speech is a value everyone holds dear when it protects that particular
individual's speech. First Amendment principles, however, are quickly and
easily set aside when speech challenges that particular person's position.
Freedom of expression is frequently trumpeted as one of the most cherished
rights, but this seems true only when the speech is relatively unimportant.
"It is a paradox of modem life that speech, although highly prized, enjoys
its great protection in part because it is so often of no concern to anyone.
To an almost alarming degree, tolerance depends not on principle but on
indifference." 16 6 Everyday speech is never an issue; concern arises only
when speech is controversial. Provocative and controversial ideas keep our
society vital and dynamic, and it is for this reason that novel ideas need the
greatest protection of all. It is extremely troubling that society seems will-
ing to protect speech of which no one takes notice while constantly attempt-
ing to restrict speech proposing innovative solutions or challenging the
status quo. To prevent society from becoming stagnant and close-minded,
all speech must be protected.1 67 "If we can hold fast to freedom when it is
most difficult to do so, we will avoid making the easy and disastrous
mistakes."168
Many argue that instead of incurring the costs of restricting speech, uni-
versities should strive to correct the underlying racist attitudes that are the
root of the problem. 169 It will be difficult to rid society of biases until we
165. The failure to address the real causes of the hatred and intolerance is an unprincipled
way out. Breaking the Codes, supra note 14, at 8.
166. KALVEN, supra note 57, at 6.
167. People who desire to restrict speech should recall that their right to speak would not be
present had our Founding Fathers not agreed that all speech should be allowed. They should also
consider that their right to speak freely may one day be threatened if their ideas fall out of favor.
168. Matsuda, supra note 3, at 2351.
169. Delgado, supra note 6, at 361. New York University professor Sylvia Law feels that it is
probably more effective to explain the consequences of racist or sexist remarks rather than censor-
ing speech. Bahls, supra note 142, at 15. Much more than regulation is needed; we must address
the root causes of racism, which regulation alone does not do. See generally Darryl Brown, Note,
Racism and Race Relations in the University, 76 VA. L. RFnv. 295 (1990) (discussing what needs to
be accomplished). "The error of those who support hate crime legislation is in trying to fight
racism by squelching it, rather than answering it with their own better arguments." Breaking the
Codes, supra note 14, at 8.
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explore the strongest arguments for and against the bias. Even Donna E.
Shalala, former Chancellor of UW-Madison, admits that speech codes can-
not be completely effective against racism: "At Madison, we never saw this
rule as more than one tool in an array of tools to fight racism."' 170 Free
speech promotes tolerance of those different' 7 ' while limiting the diversity
of opinions will do nothing to promote tolerance, but will instead breed
anger and resentment.
Therefore, the most persuasive argument presented to address the root
problem of intolerance is promoting "more and better speech aimed to open
closed minds, rebut ignorance, and increase tolerance."172 Nadine Strossen,
ACLU president, stated: "We are never going to eliminate group hatred,
oppression or bigotry by silencing its most crass expressions and forcing
them to go underground."' 73 Racist speech serves to prevent "the decay of
the thought and rhetoric of racial equality"' 74 and the marketplace of ideas
is diminished when epithets of any type are suppressed: 75
A function of free speech under our system of government is to in-
vite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it in-
duces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as
they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative
and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and
have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an
idea. 176
To eliminate intolerance and hatred we must expose the falsehoods and in-
consistencies of those arguments supporting hatred. Exposure to concrete
facts and truths will effectively destroy the weak and ill-founded arguments
of hate groups. Their ideas will fall out of favor and become increasingly
unacceptable to all of society as a result of the public being exposed to and
recognizing the problems and weak foundations of the hate speech argu-
ment. Therefore, the answer to bigotry is not to restrict speech, but rather
to open closed minds, enlighten the ignorant, and increase tolerance by free
and open discourse. 7 7 Speech codes are an unprincipled way out, and actu-
170. Court Voids Wisconsin Us " Ban on Hate Speech, supra note 10, at 25.
171. GREENAWALT, supra note 19, at 29.
172. Andrews, supra note 3, at 7; see also Lawrence & Gunther, supra note 133, at 7.
173. Campbell, supra note 10, at 2. Some schools have started educational and counseling
programs aimed at ridding the campus of intolerance. Id.
174. WRIGHT, supra note 160, at 79. "[G]eneralized legal censorship of racist speech may
tend significantly to impair the cause of racial equality and community." Id. at 77.
175. Breaking the Codes, supra note 14, at 8. Although epithets and hate speech do not add
to the marketplace, suppressing that language diminishes the marketplace. Id.
176. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
177. Andrews, supra note 3, at 7. "If there be time to expose through discussion the false-
hood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the process of education, the remedy to be applied is more
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ally contribute to the dilemma by stifling healthy debate.17 To provide the
best available campus for minorities, administrators should take actions in-
ducing thought provoking discussion rather than suppressing alternative
views and ideas.1 7 9 The ideal place to battle racism and ignorance is in the
classroom,180 where education provides reason over reflex. Ironically, it is
here that we see the greatest efforts to restrict and control speech.
If education fails, verbally assaulted students can pursue several legal
avenues to punish their attackers. Actions for harassment, trespass, or dis-
turbing the peace can be brought without judging the content of the speech
in question. 81 If the offender's conduct is reprehensible enough to be pun-
ished, it will fall under an existing action. Another possibility is an action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. A Washington state appeals
court held that racial epithets can no longer be considered mere insulting
language182 and were deemed to be a sufficient basis for the tort of outrage
or intentional infliction of emotional distress. 8 3 However, federal courts
have held that mere name calling is not enough for an action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.18 4
speech, not enforced silence." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis &
Holmes, JJ., concurring).
178. Breaking the Codes, supra note 14, at 8.
179. Metz, supra note 6, at 36.
180. Gibbs, supra note 3, at 106.
181. Breaking the Codes, supra note 14, at 8; see also Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp.
852, 861-62 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (describing a multitude of actions available for discriminatory or
harassing behavior, including employment discrimination, assault and battery, vandalism to prop-
erty, civil rights actions, and sexual harassment).
182. Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach, Inc., 565 P.2d 1173, 1177 (Wash. 1977) (en banc).
183. Id. See generally Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racist In-
sults, Epithets and Name-calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133 (1982) (discussing an in-
dependent tort action for racial slurs).
184. Racial epithets without further conduct is insufficient to create a cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Dawson v. Zayre Dep't Stores, 499 A.2d 648, 649-50
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). Racist speech is common and is seen as part of the usual conflict people are
expected to tolerate without violent response or reaction. See Vaughn v. Pool Offshore Co., 683
F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1982); Howard v. National Cash Register Co., 388 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. Ohio
1975).
The liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty
oppressions, or other trivialities. The rough edges of our society are still in need of a good
deal of filing down, and in the meantime plaintiffs must necessarily be expected and re-
quired to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to occasional acts that
are definitely inconsiderate and unkind. There is no occasion for the law to intervene in
every case where someone's feelings are hurt.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
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V. CONCLUSION
Those in power in a community recurrently seek to repress speech
they find abhorrent; and their efforts are understandable human im-
pulses. Yet freedom of expression-and especially the protection of
dissident speech, the most important function of the First Amend-
ment-is an anti-majoritarian principle. Is it too much to hope that,
especially on a university campus, a majority can be persuaded of
the value of freedom of expression and of the resultant need to curb
our impulses to repress dissident views?' 85
Law professors are fond of saying "hard cases make bad law." This
statement applies perfectly to hate speech regulations. Although hate
speech is extremely painful to the target of that speech and troubling to the
rest of society, this fact should not force the creation of "bad law"-hate
speech codes.
The answer to the divisive problems of racism and sexism on our college
campuses does not lie in prohibiting offensive speech. Nothing will be
gained by gagging ignorant students. The only solution is complete and
total freedom of speech. Every idea must be allowed to enter the market-
place of ideas and be judged on its merits, not on a college administrator's
determination of acceptability. Unfortunately, incidents of hatred will con-
tinue because prohibiting certain speech will not eliminate the feelings and
emotions underlying the speech. These feelings will be present regardless of
the existence of hate speech regulations. We enter dangerous territory
when institutions of higher learning begin to practice thought control,
which is essentially what speech codes do. If opinions are reprehensible,
they will be destroyed in the marketplace of ideas and nothing more is re-
quired. The value of free speech is much too great to even consider limiting
a person's ability to express his or her own views, no matter how offensive
or insulting.
Initially, racist comments and other hate speech will survive in the mar-
ketplace of ideas. This is the unfortunate result of many people being com-
pletely ignorant about different groups of people. The solution is
continuing education. Attention should focus on educating minority
groups on how to place their beliefs in the marketplace of ideas, answering
the derogatory remarks. Minority groups and their supporters must take
an active stand in fighting the ignorance directed at them. Rather than
restricting speech, those concerned about intolerance should seek to answer
the insulting statements of the speaker. If colleges and universities are truly
committed to solving the problems of hatred and intolerance, they should
185. Lawrence & Gunther, supra note 133, at 41.
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assist those opposing intolerance by contributing strong and valid argu-
ments attacking hatred. A conflict between the ideas is inevitable and only
the strongest will survive.
STEVEN R. GLASER
